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COMMENTS
Strict Products Liability for Injuries prior to Sale or
Delivery: A Proposed "Stream of Commerce" Test
An automobile manufacturer directs one of its employees to take
a newly-assembled vehicle on a test ride in a rural area.- During the
drive, one of the wheels on the car, being defective, becomes dis-
lodged, and strikes an oncoming motorist's vehicle, causing serious
injury.
A soft-drink bottler contracts to sell a bulk amount of bottled
beverages to a distributor. As the truck in which the beverages are
being delivered sits outside the store into which they are subse-
quently going to be delivered, one of the bottles explodes, injuring
a consumer about to enter the store to make a purchase.
A manufacturer of natural gas completes its processing of the gas
and places it in an interstate pipeline in final, marketable, and
usable form. En route to the plant of the initial purchaser-a dis-
tributor-the gas leaks from the pipeline and ignites, causing an
explosion and injuring large numbers of persons. These individuals
claim the gas was defective because it did not contain proper addi-
tives to facilitate detection.
In all of the above-described hypothetical situations, the injured
parties bring suit against the manufacturers, under theories of negli-
gence, strict liability in tort, and breach of warranty. The manufac-
turers protest that strict liability and breach of warranty claims
cannot arise if the product has not been the subject of a sale or
exchange. The resolution of these disputes, and similar conflicting
contentions, is the subject of this comment.
I. INTRODUCTION
The regime of strict products liability, I which had .its most deci-
1. Liability for injuries from products historically was based primarily in negligence, and
early cases at common law denied recovery to a party who was not in privity of contract with
the seller. See, e.g., Winterbottom v. Wright, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. 1842) (recovery in
negligence denied to injured coachman against once-removed supplier of defective coach
which broke dam). In MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916),
the requirement of vertical privity, or a direct contractual relationship along the distribution
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sive tort' genesis in the 1963 opinion of the California Supreme
Court in Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc.,3 allows a person
injured by a defective and unreasonably dangerous4 product to re-
chain, was abolished in a negligence action against the manufacturer of an automobile which
collapsed due to a defective wheel and injured the ultimate purchaser.
The concept of strict liability, expressed by many early courts as in the nature of an action
for breach of an implied warranty, was first recognized over 500 years ago in cases involving
sellers of unwholesome food products. See PROSSER, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict
Liability to the Consumer), 69 YAi.E L.J. 1099, 1103-04 (1960). In these early cases also, the
warranty ran only from the seller to the immediate buyer, but most jurisdictions eventually
abolished the privity requirement in those types of cases. See Gillam, Products Liability in a
Nutshell, 37 ORE. L. REv. 119, 152-55 (1958). In addition, most jurisdictions, beginning in the
early 1950's, began recognizing that strict liability based on an implied warranty theory
should extend to other products which created a hazard to human life, health and safety when
defective. See cases cited in Miller v. Preitz, 422 Pa. 383, 417 n.4, 221 A.2d 320, 337 n.4 (1966)
(Roberts, J., concurring and dissenting). These courts also customarily did away with the
requirement of vertical privity. See, e.g., Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358,
161 A.2d 69 (1960) (recovery in implied warranty allowed to the injured user against the
manufacturer of an automobile with a defective steering mechanism which caused it to go
out of control). It was not until 1963 that the concept of "strict tort liability," later to be
expressed in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965), became the law in an
American jurisdiction. See Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897,
27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963). See also note 3 and accompanying text infra. For the purpose of
this comment, the term "strict products liability" refers to both strict tort liability and breach
of warranty liability.
2. At early common law, the breach of warranty action referred to supra, in note 1, lay in
tort. See Ames, History of Assumpsit, 2 HARv. L. REv. 1, 8 (1888). However, later the warranty
action became associated with the law of contracts and sales. See Comment, Strict Products
Liability to the Bystander: A Study in Common Law Determinism, 38 U. Cm. L. REv. 625,
627-28 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Strict Products Liability to the Bystander]. This warranty
liability, in assumpsit, was codified in the text of the Uniform Commercial Code, §§ 2-313,
2-314, and 2-315, [hereinafter cited as U.C.C.] creating statutory express and implied war-
ranties in the sale of goods.
3. 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, (1963). Justice Traynor, the author of
the opinion for the court in Greenman, had argued for strict liability in tort long before that
case, in his concurrence in Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 461, 150 P.2d
436, 440 (1944) (Traynor, J., concurring).
4. The language "unreasonably dangerous" did not appear in the Greenman enunciation
of the strict tort liability concept, but in the text of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
402A (1965). This section reads as follows:
§ 402A. Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical Harm to User or Consumer
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the
user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby
caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial
change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his
product, and
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cover damages without the burden of proving fault 5 on the part of
the manufacturer or seller. Strict liability also has an older,6 con-
tractual basis in the breach of warranty remedy, now codified in
Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code,7 so that the injured
party now invariably pursues remedies under section 402A of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts,' on a theory of breach of express or
implied warranties, and in negligence.
Strict liability claims most commonly arise after the product in
question is sold by the manufacturer, changes hands with several
intermediate sellers, and then is sold to the ultimately injured con-
sumer. In these situations, there is clearly a "sale" of the product9
and strict liability is an appropriate ground for relief. A more unset-
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any
contractual relation with the seller.
Id. [hereinafter cited as § 402A or 402A]. Although a majority of American jurisdictions have
adopted this section, see R. HUISH & H. BAILEY, 1 AMERicAN LAW OF PRODUCrs LIABILITY 2d §
4:41 (1974 and Supp. 1978) [hereinafter cited as HusiH & BAILEY], some jurisdictions have
arguably refused to attach the "unreasonably dangerous" requirement to strict liability, or
modified an original, total incorporation of § 402A to eliminate the requirement. See, e.g.,
Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 131-32, 501 P.2d 1153, 1159, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433,
439 (1972) (declaring that the factor was never part of California law). But see Barker v. Lull
Eng'ring Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1978) (clarifying the Cronin
case and stating that, although "unreasonably dangerous" is inappropriate, product may be
found defective in design if the jury is convinced that defendant has established, on balance,
that the benefits of the challenged design outweigh the risk of danger inherent in such design).
See also Azzarello v. Black Bros., Co., 391 A.2d 1020 (Pa. 1978) (modifying Pennsylvania's
original adoption of § 402A in Webb v. Zern, 422 Pa. 424, 220 A.2d 853 (1966) to apparently
eliminate the requirement that an injured plaintiff prove the product unreasonably danger-
ous). For a criticism of this development, see Comment, Elimination of "Unreasonably Dan-
gerous" From § 402A-The Price of Consumer Safety?, 14 DuQ. L. REv. 25, 58-61 (1975).
5. In Greenman the court characterized plaintiff's new strict tort burden of proof as
follows:
To establish the manufacturer's liability it was sufficient plaintiff proved that he was
injured while using the Shopsmith in way it was intended to be used as a result of a
defect in design and manufacture of which plaintiff was, not aware that made the
Shopsmith unsafe for its intended use.
Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d at 63, 377 P.2d at 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 701.
In many cases, plaintiffs nevertheless elect to also pursue a cause of action sounding in
negligence in addition to the strict liability counts, which can create problems for the plain-
tiff, since the defendant is then entitled to a charge to the jury on contributory negligence,
which is not a defense in strict liability claims. See, e.g., Seidelson, The 402A Defendant and
the Negligent Actor, 15 DuQ. L. REv. 371, 379-83 (1977).
6. See notes 1-2 supra.
7. U.C.C. §§ 2-313, 2-314, 2-315. See also note 2 supra.
8. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965). See note 4 supra.
9. See id. ("One who sells any product .... " (emphasis added)); U.C.C., § 2-106 ("[a]
sale consists in the passage of title from the seller to buyer for a price .... ").
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tled question-and the subject of this comment-is whether strict
liability is appropriate in those cases in which injury occurs from a
defective product before its initial market exchange between the
manufacturer and reseller. In these situations, the policy of strict
liability'1 to protect innocent persons from the hazards of defective
products conflicts with the argument of the manufacturers that
imposition of liability where dominion and control still rest with the
manufacturer will discourage them from making adjustments to
finished products."
10. In Greenman, Justice Traynor explained the purpose behind the "new" doctrine as
follows: "[tihe purpose of such liability is to insure that the cost of injuries resulting from
defective products are borne by the manufacturers that put such products on the market
rather than by the injured persons who are powerless to protect themselves." 57 Cal. 2d at
63, 377 P.2d at 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 701. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A,
comment c (1965); Peterson v. Lou Backrodt Chevrolet Co., 17 Ill. App. 3d 690, 307 N.E.2d
729, 732 (1974) ("[mlanufacturers of defective products are strictly liable for harm caused
by such products as public policy demands that responsibility to be fixed wherever it will
most effectively reduce the hazards to life and health inherent in such products which reach
the market"); Keystone Aeronautics Corp. v. R.J. Enstrom Corp., 499 F.2d 146, 149 (3d Cir.
1974) ("the purposes of § 402A [are] protection of the average consumer who is not really in
a position to bargain effectively or intelligently").
11. A similar argument would be raised by a retailer against a shopper, for example, in a
suit to recover for injuries sustained from a bottle which explodes while sitting on a shelf as
the unlucky shopper passed by the soft drink section with his or her cart. In that case,
however, the injured party would still have a cause of action against the manufacturer (bot-
tler), assuming that the jurisdiction protects innocent bystanders, since its initial sale would
have taken place. That hypothetical is only addressed for analogy purposes, see notes 51-60
and accompanying text infra, in this comment, which is directed at injuries before the prod-
uct has exchanged hands with the initial purchaser and which, therefore, implicates
manufacturer-sellers only. But see Shopper's World v. Villarreal, 518 S.W.2d 913 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1975), where the court held that a woman who slipped and fell on liquid soap which
had leaked from a slit in a bottle of the soap she had placed into her shopper's cart but had
not paid for stated a claim under § 402A against the retailer. The court stated:
The crucial time when appellees must establish that a defect existed is that moment
when the bottle of soap was removed from the display shelf by Mrs. Villarreal. We feel
that this is the meaning of § 402(1)b which states that a seller is liable if the defective
product "is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial
change in the condition in which it was sold". The solution to this problem turns on
the meaning of the term "sold". It has now been recognized that neither a change in
possession nor an actual sale is required.
Id. at 917 (citing Darryl v. Ford Motor Co., 440 S.W.2d 630 (Tex. 1969) and Davis v. Gibson
Prods. Co., 505 S.W.2d 682 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973) (holding that a boy who was injured while
examining a machete encased in a defective leather sheath stated a claim under § 402A; that
"[tihe liability created by the doctrine of strict liability rests on forseeability, and not on
esoteric concepts relating to transfer or delivery of possession.")) Id. at 691. But see Loch v.
Confair, 361 Pa. 158, 63 A.2d 24 (1949) (holding that wife of shopper who was injured when
husband picked up bottle of carbonated beverage and it exploded could not state a cause of
action for breach of warranty since no sale or delivery of the bottle had occurred). For a more
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This comment will analyze those cases which have confronted this
problem and will attempt to reach a satisfactory compromise be-
tween these two divergent arguments. 12 A functional test for deter-
mining the point in time at which strict liability should attach will
be advocated which will take into account these competing inter-
ests.
I1. EXISTING CASE LAW
The types of cases in which the precise questions addressed in this
comment appear to comprise, generally, two classifications. The
first classification concerns injuries arising from finished 3 products
which are still in the manufacturer's ultimate control or within its
plant. In this group, there may be a further subdivision depending
on whether the product is being used, either for testing purposes or
intended use, or whether it is simply being stored at the time the
injury occurs. The second classification describes situations where
the finished product has been placed in the channels of distribution
and transported toward an ultimate, initial exchange, during which
injury occurs. For each classification, there is a scarcity of case
thorough discussion of these cases, see notes 51-60 and accompanying text infra. For a discus-
sion of the questionable precedential value of Loch, see note 51 infra.
It must also be noted at this point that, in most of the cases and hypotheticals discussed
in the comment, the injured party would be able to invoke the inference of res ipsa loquitur
in a negligence action. Despite its advantage, most commentators agree that res ipsa
loquitur is deficient when used in a strict liability cause of action, see, e.g., W. PROSSER,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 69, at 671 (4th ed. 1971); Murray, Pennsylvania Pro-
ducts Liability-A Clarification of the Search for a Clear and Understandable Rule, 33 U.
Prrr. L. Rv. 391, 393 n.7 (1973), [hereinafter cited as Pennsylvania Products Liability].
The relative merits or weaknesses of a negligence claim based on res ipsa loquitur will not
be pursued in this comment.
12. Throughout this comment, a conscious attempt is made to set forth the existing state
of Pennsylvania law, not only wherever general developments in the law of products liability
are stated, but also in those sections where the specific problems which are the topic of the
comment are discussed.
13. Liability against the manufacturer of a particular product could not, of course, be
imposed prior to the completion of the manufacturing or assembling process, since § 402A
operates on a "product," not a collection of unassembled pieces or unprocessed goods (when
processing is contemplated). See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A & comment e
(1965). The only exception to this principle might be where an article which is volatile or
dangerous-such as gas or chemicals-is for some reason transported from one processing
plant to another and en route, a defect in the product causes injury. See notes 120 & 123 and
accompanying text infra.
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authority, and the few courts which have grappled with these prob-
lems have reached differing results."
A. Products Still in the Manufacturer's Control or Physical Plant
After products have been completely manufactured and while
they remain on the manufacturer's premises or within its control,
injuries can arise in several ways. First, during the testing process
which often follows, injuries can occur from defects in the product.
Similarly, cases have arisen where the manufacturer has decided to
use one of its finished products in the manner for which it was
intended, and injury has occurred to an employee or innocent by-
stander. Finally, injury can occur if a defective product acts so as
to cause injury while it is simply in a state of storage or inventory
on the manufacturer's premises.
The case of Armstrong Rubber Co. v. Urquidez'5 is illustrative of
injury arising during the testing process. In Armstrong, Automotive
Proving Grounds contracted with Armstrong Rubber to provide the
latter with tire-testing facilities on a part-time basis.', Clemente
Urquidez was employed by Automotive as a test driver," and his
employer directed him to drive a tractor-trailer rig owned by Arm-
strong on a 60 mile-per-hour test on an oval track.'8 During this test
drive, "a non-interest spare"'" tire on the left front of the tractor
blew out, forcing Urquidez into the infield area of the track, where
the truck overturned, killing him. 0 The "non-interest" spare was a
14. Compare, e.g., Winkler v. Hyster Co., 54 Ill. App. 3d 282, 369 N.E.2d 606 (1977)
(forklift manufactured and being used by defendant in its plant, causing injury, had not
entered the stream of commerce) with Douglas v. E. & J. Gallo Winery, 69 Cal. App. 3d 103,
137 Cal. Rptr. 797 (1977) (recovery in strict liability implied in favor of plaintiff-employee
injured by product manufactured and being used by defendant on its premises). See generally
case authority discussed in the text of this section.
15. 570 S.W.2d 374 (Tex. 1978), rev'g 560 S.W.2d 781 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977).
16. Id. at 375. The contract between Automotive and Armstrong required Automotive to
provide testing facilities to Armstrong on a part-time basis for ten years. Under the contract,
Armstrong agreed to provide and maintain all trucks and vehicles required for its testing.
Automotive was responsible for maintaining the trucks and buildings comprising the testing
facility, providing drivers, mechanics, and other personnel necessary for testing purposes, and
developing safety rules and driver qualification requirements. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Both front tires were "non-interest" spares meaning that, although Armstrong had
manufactured and placed them on the truck for the purpose of the test, they were not being




tire mounted on the test truck along with the tires being tested, but
which, while being used, was not itself being tested .2'
Urquidez' widow and son brought suit against Armstrong Rubber
on a theory of strict liability." Judgments for the plaintiffs in the
lower courtsn were reversed by the Supreme Court of Texas, which
held that since Armstrong had never released the non-interest spare
to an "ordinary user or consumer, ' '2 4 the tire had always remained
in the industrial testing process and strict liability was therefore
inappropriate. Although technically the defective tire was not the
subject of that particular test,2s the court decided that the tire at
all times remained in the testing process and in the control of the
defendant. It stated that, although application of strict liability
does not depend upon a sale, the product nevertheless must be
released in some manner to the consuming public in order to enter
the stream of commerce.26
In response to plaintiff's argument that the defendant had placed
the tire into the stream of commerce because it had bailed" the
product to Automotive, the court decided that this was a non-
21. Id. See also note 19 and accompanying text supra.
22. It is apparent from the court's opinion that the plaintiffs advanced their strict liability
theory solely on the basis of § 402A, and did not make an argument under the warranty
provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. tit. 1, §§ 2.313-
.315 (Vernon 1968). Since the transaction involved was at best a bailment and not a sale, it
may be questioned whether the plaintiffs could have invoked the Code in any case. See
U.C.C., TEx. Bus. & CoM. CODE ANN. tit. 1, § 2.106 (Vernon 1968) ("[a] sale consists in the
passing title from the seller to the buyer for a price. ... ); First Nat'l Bank v. Joseph T.
Ryerson & Son, Inc., 487 S.W.2d 377 (Tex. Civ. App. 1972) (holding that a sale is a transfer
for consideration, of personal property by the passage of title from the seller to the buyer).
However these limitations do not now constrain a party suing a bailor under § 402A or
warranty, since the trend has been to expand strict liability to many different types of parties
beside simply "sellers." See notes 27-28, 43-48, and 109-114 and accompanying text infra.
23. The trial court rendered judgment on the jury's determination that the tire was
defective in its design or manufacture and that the defect was the producing cause of the
injury. The Texas Court of Civil Appeals affirmed, holding that the tire was one regularly
sold by Armstrong in the regtilar channels of commerce, and "felither because the manufac-
turer could reasonably forsee injury to this driver, or because of the policy consideration of
loss spreading, or because of the desire to minimize risk of personal injury, the doctrine should
be extended to this test driver .... " Armstrong Rubber Co. v. Urquidez, 560 S.W.2d 781,
784 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977), rev'd 570 S.W.2d 374 (Tex. 1978).
24. 570 S.W.2d at 377.
25. See notes 19 & 20 and accompanying text supra.
26. 570 S.W.2d at 376.
27. Id. In this regard, the transaction may be viewed as one where, essentially, Armstrong
only loaned the tire to Automotive to use in pursuit of the tire tests and in order that
Automotive fulfill its duty under the contract. See note 16 and accompanying text supra.
Armstrong realized no commercial quid pro quo benefit from the bailment of the tire itself.
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commercial bailment and distinguished cases from other jurisdic-
tions extending section 402A liability to commercial bailment trans-
actions.28
Winkler v. Hyster Co. 9 involved injury to an employee of the
defendant caused by a defective forklift manufactured by defendant
and being used in its plant. The plaintiff, a welder, was injured at
his work station in the course of his employment 0 when cargo fell
from the lift truck. The lower court dismissed the complaint 3 on the
basis that plaintiff did not come within the Illinois "dual purpose
doctrine," which permits recovery by the employee from the em-
ployer if the injuries resulted from a breach by the employer of a
duty that did not rise out of the employer-employee relationship.32
On appeal, the Illinois Court of Appeals affirmed on the basis of the
workmen's compensation issue, and then went further and decided
plaintiff had not stated a claim under section 402A in any event. 33
After recognizing the rule of Delaney v. Towmotor Corp.34 that sec-
tion 402A is applicable in the absence of a sale if the party charged
with liability has placed a defective article in the "stream of com-
merce" by other means, 35 the court nevertheless decided that be-
28. Id. at 376-77 (citing Whitfield v. Cooper, 30 Conn. Supp. 47, 298 A.2d 50 (1972).
Nowakowski v. Hoppe Tire Co., 39 Ill. App. 3d 155, 349 N.E.2d 578 (1974), Bainter v.
Lamoine LP Gas Co., 24 Ill. App. 3d 913, 321 N.E.2d 744 (1974), and Fullbright v. Klamath
Gas Co., 271 Or. 449, 533 P.2d 316 (1975) as examples of cases extending the doctrine of strict
tort liability to bailment transactions). See also notes 43-48 & 109-114 and accompanying text
infra. The court decided that these cases were distinguishable because in each case cited, the
mutual benefit accompanied a sale of goods or services and in each case the manufacturer
released the product to a customer, while in Urquidez the transaction accompanied an in-
dustrial testing process and there was no release of the product to a customer. 570 S.W.2d at
376-77.
29. 54 Ill. App. 3d 282, 369 N.E.2d 606 (1977).
30. Since plaintiff was injured on his job, the major issue in the case was whether the
Illinois Workmen's Compensation Act, § 5(a), ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 48 138.5(a) (1973) barred
his tort claim. Under Illinois interpretations of this section, an employee who could prove that
his injuries resulted from the employer's breach of duty unrelated to the employer-employee
relationship could recover in tort. See note 32 and accompanying text infra.
31. 54 Ill. App. 3d at 283, 369 N.E.2d at 609.
32. See, e.g., Laffoon v. Bell & Zoller Coal Co., 65 Ill. 2d 437, 359 N.E.2d 125 (1976)
(stating the dual purpose or dual capacity doctrine). But see McCarty v. City Marshall, 51
Ill. App. 3d 842, 366 N.E.2d 1052 (1977) (questioning the application of the rule to case where
party was not direct employee of defendant).
33. 54 Ill. 3d at 287, 369 N.E.2d at 610.
34. 339 F.2d 4 (2d Cir..1964) (manufacturer strictly liable in tort after it bailed finished
product to prospective purchaser to use as a demonstrator and employee of prespective
purchaser injured). See notes 39-46 and accompanying text infra.
35. 54 Ill. App. 3d at 287, 369 N.E.2d at 610.
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cause the forklift had never left Hyster's plant, it had not been
placed in the stream of commerce." In dissent,37 Presiding Justice
Craven cited the policy reasons underlying section 402A and stated
that because the defendant was using the machine, it had "entered
the stream of commerce through defendant's manufacturing pro-
cess."38
In other cases, the question of strict liability has arisen where the
plaintiff's injuries occurred during the use of the finished article by
a third party to whom the manufacturer has bailed the product
while retaining ownership. In Delaney v. Towmotor Corp.,31 a diver-
sity case in which the court applied New York law, the manufac-
turer of forklift trucks delivered one of its finished forklifts to a
stevedoring firm, a prospective buyer,4" to be used on a trial demon-
stration basis by the stevedoring company. 1 During that trial use,
the plaintiff was injured by a defect in the product, and he sued the
manufacturer of the truck under a theory of breach of implied war-
ranty. 2
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit af-
firmed a district court judgment for the plaintiff, finding it unneces-
sary to decide whether the facts of the case brought the plaintiff
within the New York rule limiting breach of warranty recovery to
"bailment for hire" situations. 3 Under that rule, the plaintiff could
not have recovered had the court found that defendant was a gratui-
tous bailor." Instead, the court of appeals recognized that New York
36. Id.
37. Id. at 288, 369 N.E.2d at 610 (Craven, P.J., dissenting).
38. Id. at 290, 369 N.E.2d at 612. Justice Craven reasoned as follows: "[tihe defendant
most certainly did not gratuitously transfer the lift truck from his inventory to the depart-
ment in which it was used. There was an exchange albeit an internal one." Id.
39. 339 F.2d 4 (2d Cir. 1964) (Friendly, J.).
40. Id. at 5.
41. Id.
42. Delaney alleged both negligence in design and manufacturer's strict liability. The
defendant impleaded the manufacturer of the allegedly defective overhead guard and the
plaintiff's employer. The jury found for original defendant-manufacturer on the claim of
negligence in design but for plaintiff on the strict liability count, and the trial judge dismissed
the manufacturer's third-party claim against the manufacturer of the component part. Id.
On this issue, the court of appeals affirmed on the basis that Towmotor had specified the
design of the component part and thus could not hold its manufacturer liable. Id. at 7.
43. Id. at 6 (citing Covello v. State, 17 Misc. 2d 637, 187 N.Y.S.2d 396 (Ct. Cl. 1959) (a
bailor-bailee relationship for mutual benefit) and Knapp v. Gould Auto Co., 252 A.D. 430,
433, 299 N.Y.S. 688, 691 (1937) the only duty of bailor in gratuitous bailment situation is to
give warning of those defects of which it had actual knowledge)).
44. See note 42 and accompanying text supra.
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would apply strict liability to the product in suit,45 and regarded
section 402A's reference to one who sells a product as a description
of the situation that would most often arise rather than as a con-
scious limitation of the principle to cases where the product has
been sold; the court decided that the framers of section 402A did not
mean to intentionally exclude from its scope situations "where a
manufacturer has placed a defective article in the stream of com-
merce by other means.
46
The court held that Delaney was entitled to recover for the same
reasons he would recover had Towmotor first sold the product to its
distributor or sold the machine to plaintiffs employer for a nominal
downpayment, subject to return if the employer was dissatisfied."
On similar grounds, several other courts have held manufacturer-
bailors strictly liable if the product is being used for the purpose
intended even though the manufacturer has retained full control
and ownership over it."
The second classification of injuries arises from a finished product
which is being stored on the manufacturer's premises. For example,
should a manufacturer of bottled or canned propane gas be strictly
liable if the gas escapes from one of the cannisters while it is on the
manufacturer's premises, ignites and seriously injures several
passers-by? The courts have not yet been presented with this ques-
tion, but the answer would clearly seem to be in the negative, since
the manufacturer in this situation would not have placed the prod-
uct in transit on its way to an ultimate sale and would not have been
testing or using the product in any way at the time of the injury.
On the other hand, the products are in their final, marketable state
at that point and assuming that all testing has occurred, the by-
stander" plaintiffs could argue that the fact that they are in storage,
45. 339 F.2d at 5-6 (citing Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 432, 436-
37, 240 N.Y.S.2d 592, 594-95, 191 N.E.2d 81 (1963) (case adopting strict liability in tort as
appropriate products liability standard)).
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. See HuasH & BAILEy, supra note 4, §§ 6:7 and 6:13 (1974 & Supp. 1978). See also notes
109-114 and accompanying text infra. Applying strict liability to bailment situations requires
the court to decide whether the form of the transaction itself should have any effect; usually
the injury arises after the product has "exchanged hands" between the manufacturer and
bailee, and is in use. This differs somewhat from the analysis in part II,B, infra, which
concerns liability for defects causing injury while the product is in transit. The analysis in
part II,B would be applicable, nevertheless, in a bailment case where the injury arose while
the product was in transit between the manufacturer and the bailee.
49. Absent a situation like that found in Winkler v. Hyster Co., supra notes 29-38, where
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awaiting an eventual sale, warrants the imposition of liability.'" For
highly volatile products, for example, plaintiffs would argue that
strict liability should begin to attach after the manufacturing pro-
cess is complete, wherever the harm to the consuming public in
general arises and wherever it is forseeable that injury can arise from
defects in the product.
Although no cases precisely describing this situation are reported,
an analogy may be found in cases where store shoppers have sued
the retailer on theories of strict liability for injuries resulting from
defective goods on store shelves.5' The result in this type of case as
to the retailer is not crucial to the injured plaintiff, since there is a
cause of action against the manufacturer52 in strict tort liability and
the denial of liability against the retailer does not deprive the plain-
tiff of a recovery altogether.
Nevertheless, the courts which have addressed this fact situation
an employee was injured from a defective product on the premises, most of the injuries from
products in storage will occur to innocent third-party bystanders. Bystanders have attained
increased protection under both § 402A and breach of warranty doctrines, although the latter
more recently due to the historic requirement of privity of contract. See Strict Products
Liability to the Bystander, supra note 1, at 627-35; Annot., 33 A.L.R.3d 415 (1970 & Supp.
1978); Salvador v. Atlantic Steel Boiler Co., 457 Pa. 24, 319 A.2d 903 (1974). See also notes
93-108 and accompanying text infra.
50. Cf. Davis v. Gibson Prods. Co., 505 S.W.2d 682, 691 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973) ("[tjhe
stream of commerce includes the manufacture of the object and its distribution, including
the activities of retailers").
51. See, e.g., Kroger Co. v. Bowman, 411 S.W.2d 339 (Ky. 1967); Rogers v. Karem, 405
S.W.2d 741 (Ky. 1966); Gillespie v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 14 N.C. App. 1, 187 S.E.2d
441 .(1972); Shopper's World v. Villarreal, 518 S.W.2d 913 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975); Davis v.
Gibson Prods. Co., 505 S.W.2d 682 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973). See generally HURSH & BAILEY,
supra note 4, § 6:2 at 40-43; notes 52-60 and accompanying text infra. In Loch v. Confair,
361 Pa. 158, 63 A.2d 24 (1949), a woman was injured when a beverage bottle her husband
was lifting from the shelf in a grocery store exploded and a piece of flying glass pierced her
leg. She and her husband sued the bottle manufacturer in assumpsit under a theory of breach
of implied warranties. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the trial court's sustain-
ing of defendant's demurrer on the basis that no sale or delivery of the product had occurred.
The precedential value of Loch must be questioned in light of the fact that it preceded
Pennsylvania's adoption of section 402A in Webb v. Zern, 422 Pa. 424, 220 A.2d 853 (1966)
and the cases establishing that innocent bystanders with no contractual relationship with the
manufacturer are entitled to strict liability protection in Pennsylvania. See Kassab v. Central
Soya, 432 Pa. 217, 246 A.2d 848 (1968) and Salvador v. Atlantic Steel Boiler Co., 457 Pa. 24,
319 A.2d 903 (1974). See also notes 99-105 & accompanying text infra.
52. This assumes, as noted earlier (see notes 11 & 49 and accompanying text supra) that
the jurisdiction protects innocent bystanders. The reason the injured party in that jurisdic-
tion would have a cause of action against the manufacturer in any event is because a sale
and transfer of possession has taken place from the manufacturers to at least one reseller.
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have uniformly held that a store customer can recover53 under sec-
tion 402A for a defect in a product which causes injury while the
customer is examining it prior to purchase. Two Texas decisions54
and two Kentucky decisions,15 have held that a customer injured
while either examining an item in the store, 56 lifting it from the
shelf 7 or wheeling it around in a shopping cart58 stated a cause of
action. The placing of these items on the store shelves by the retailer
is analogous to the storage of finished products by a manufacturer:
the only difference would be that the retail cases involve a prospec-
tive customer handling the product in anticipation of a purchase.
In the manufacturer analogy, on the other hand, the goods would
not be stored for the express purpose of attracting potential custom-
ers, and strict liability would therefore appear to be inappropriate
since no danger to the consuming public would exist. Depending
upon the dangerousness of the product, however, a court might
apply a test focusing on that point in time at which potential harm
to the public has arisen, following those courts which have decided
that the determination of what point in time 402A liability attaches
depends on when potential harm is forseeableo by the manufac-
turer.
53. The inference of negligence provided by the res ipsa loquitur doctrine is invariably
available to the injured party in these types of cases as to his negligence count. See HURSH &
BAUEY, supra note 4, at § 6:2 and cases cited therein.
54. Shopper's World v. Villarreal, 518 S.W.2d 913 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975) (wife allowed to
recover against supermarket operator when she slipped and fell upon liquid soap that had
leaked from plastic bottle she had placed in cart); Davis v. Gibson Prods. Co., 505 S.W.2d
682 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973) (parent allowed to recover on behalf of son against self-service store
for injuries sustained when her son was cut while examining a machete he had removed from
shelf to examine).
55. Kroger Co. v. Bowman, 411 S.W.2d 339 (Ky. 1976) (injured plaintiff allowed to recover
against bottler and grocery store for injuries when soft-drink bottle fell from cardboard, six-
pack carton as she attempted to remove it from shelf); Rogers v. Karem, 405 S.W.2d 741 (Ky.
1966) (similar factual situation).
56. Davis v. Gibson Prods. Co., 505 S.W.2d 682 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973).
57. Kroger Co. v. Bowman, 411 S.W.2d 339 (Ky. 1967); Rogers v. Karem, 405 S.W.2d 741
(Ky. 1966). See also Renninger v. Foremost Dairies, Inc., 171 So. 2d 602 (Fla. App. 1965)
(plaintiff's injury when bottle of milk broke while being taken from dairy case to shopping
cart stated breach of warranty claim).
58. Shopper's World v. Villarreal, 518 S.W.2d 913 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975).
59. Cf. notes 115-120 and accompanying text infra.
60. See, e.g., Davis v. Gibson Prods. Co., 505 S.W.2d 682, 691 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973)
("[tihe liability created by the doctrine of strict liability rests on forseeability, and not on
esoteric concepts relating to transfer or delivery of possession."). Accord, Elmore v. American
Motors Corp., 70 Cal. 2d 578, 45 P.2d 84, 75 Cal. Rptr. 652 (1969) (stating that the purpose
of strict liability in tort was to make the industry responsible for all of the forseeable harm
done by its defective products).
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B. Injuries from Products in Transit but Before Delivery
The second classification of pre-sale or pre-delivery injuries from
defective products involves incidents that occur while the finished
product is en route to an ultimate sale or transfer with the initial
purchaser. In some cases, products at this "stage" are the subject
of pre-existing contracts of sale; in others, they are simply in transit
on the way either to another plant of the manufacturer or its distrib-
utor, or to the plant of a reseller. In both situations, a potential
danger from the defective product to the public at large may have
arisen or may in fact have culminated in injury.
The types of cases in which the question of strict liability for
goods in transit has most often arisen are those involving hazardous
substances such as electricity, gas, or potentially dangerous explo-
sive materials. In these cases, a common denominator exists: the
manufacturer is transporting the product within or along a distribu-
tion line, and, due to some defect in that system, the independently-
defective"' product escapes from its container or covering and causes
injury.
The courts have consistently held in the electricity cases that the
manufacturer is not strictly liable in situations where an innocent
third-party bystander is injured or buildings are damaged from
high-voltage electrical cables or transmission lines,6" and at least
61. Unlike the rule clearly applied to tangible consumer products-that a defect in the
product's container or package is a defect in the product itself-defects in the "covering" or
"packaging" of products like gas or electricity are only arguably defects in the product itself,
since the distribution line or pipe is not an inherent part of the finished product which reaches
the hands of the consumer. It would therefore appear to behoove the plaintiff to allege a defect
in the product itself. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 402A, Comment h (1965) (stating
strict liability rule for defects in a product's container or package); Genaust v. Illinois Power
Co., 62 Ill. 2d 456, 463-64, 343 N.E.2d 465, 470 (1976) (stating that § 402A does not apply
where only defect alleged is defect in electrical company's transmission line). But cf. Univer-
sity of Pittsburgh v. Equitable Gas Co., 126 P.L.J. 213, 215 (Pa. C.P. Allegheny County 1978)
(holding that buyer and user of natural gas service whose property was damaged by explosion
from ignited, leaking gas from defendant's main could recover for defect in the pipeline also,
since in buying the service the buyer is exposed to the hazards of the entire distribution
system). Cases like University of Pittsburgh might be justified on the basis that it is impossi-
ble for the consumer to purchase a "gallon" of gas or electricity, and that the pipeline or
transmission system is an inherent part of the finished product. See also notes 62-75 and
accompanying text infra.
62. See, e.g., Genaust v. Illinois Power Co., 62 Ill. 2d 456, 343 N.E.2d 465 (1976) (electrical
contractor injured when current from defendant's uninsulated power line arced to antenna
he was installing atop a tower); Petroski v. Nckhern Ind. Pub. Serv. Co., 354 N.E.2d 736 (Ind.
App. 1976) (14-year old boy injured when he came into contact with uninsulated high-voltage
wire which ran through a tree in which he was playing); Williams v. Detroit Edison Co., 63
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one court has held that a gas manufacturer is not strictly liable
when persons are injured or buildings are damaged by an explosion
from leaking gas from an interstate pipeline. 3 The basic reason the
courts denied strict liability claims in the electricity cases, however,
would appear to be that the plaintiff was unable to establish a
defective condition in the product itself,' although some courts
flatly stated65 that along the distribution lines, the product is within
Mich. App. 559, 234 N.W.2d 702 (1975) (workman of a company constructing a water line
injured when backhoe being used to dig a hole struck power line, causing it to fall to ground
and strike plaintiff); Buckeye Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Detroit Edison Co., 38 Mich. App. 325,
196 N.W.2d 316 (1972) (insurers of homes destroyed by fire allegedly the result of a spark
from defendant's overhead transmission lines and transformer into the homes suing on subro-
gation theory).
63. See Shriver v. Consolidated Gas Supply Corp., No. G.D. 78-14818 (Pa. C.P. Allegheny
County February 9, 1979) (opinion and order sustaining demurrer to strict liability counts of
plaintiff's complaint) (bystanders injured by explosion from gas having leaked from defen-
dant's interstate liquid propane transmission line in rural area). See also notes 71-75 and
accompanying text infra.
64. See Genaust v. Illinois Power Co., 62 Ill. 2d 456, 343 N.E.2d 465 (1976) where the court
stated:
Assuming, arguendo, that electricity is a "product," it does not logically follow that
the wires are its "packaging". A package is "a covering, wrapper or container .... "
It cannot be held that wires, which are an instrument used to transmit electric energy,
fall within this definition . . . . Even if plaintiff's contention were accepted, the doc-
trine of strict liability would still not be applicable . . . . The only "product" that was
in the process of being sold was the electricity itself, and plaintiff does not contend
there was any defect in the electricity. The fact that the wires may have been located
too close to the ground does not allege any defect in the wires or the electricity.
Id. at 463-64, 343 N.E.2d at 469-70 (emphasis added). If a court adopts the rationale that
the plaintiff in an electricity case must allege and prove adefect in the product itself, then
as a practical matter electricity companies will be arguably insulated from section 402A
liability, since it is difficult to envision how electricity can be "defective." This circumstance
might justify a court in imposing strict liability against electricity manufacturers for defects
in the transmission system such as low-hanging cables or improperly-insulated lines, for
example, on the theory that the consuming public is exposed to the hazards of the entire
distribution system. In response to the manufacturer's certain argument that the electricity's
"package"-its cable or line-is not a part of the finished product like a bottle is part of a
finished beverage product, the plaintiff might counter with the argument that a consumer
can not purchase a "gallon" or "bottle" of electricity, and that the product is sufficiently
hazardous to warrant terming the transmission system as an inherent part of the end product.
Cf. University of Pittsburgh v. Equitable Gas Co., 126 P.L.J. 213 (Pa. C.P. Allegheny County
1978) (analogous rationale in case where natural gas purchaser sued to recover property
damage from explosion of leaking gas in defendant's main in street; defects alleged in both
the gas itself (lack of odorants) and the pipeline). Assuming the court accepts the argument
that defects in electricity transmission system are defects in the product itself, then the
"stream of commerce" test proposed in this comment, notes 115-133 infra, would expose the
electricity manufacturer to potential 402A liability.
65. See, e.g., Petroski v. Northern Ind. Pub. Serv. Co., 354 N.E.2d 736, 747 (Ind. App.
1976); Williams v. Detroit Edison Co., 63 Mich. App. 559, 567-68, 234 N.W.2d 702, 707 (1975);
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the exclusive control of the manufacturer and not in the "stream of
commerce."66
In the gas cases, the results have been inconsistent, to some ex-
tent. In two cases where the product escaped from gas mains in
streets adjacent to buildings, leaked into the structures, and ig-
nited, causing property damage and personal injuries, the courts
have held that the plaintiffs could recover under a theory of strict
liability. 7 Although like the electricity cases, the product techni-
cally had not transferred possession since it escaped while still in
defendant's main line, the courts held the manufacturer strictly
liable, in one case because the judge termed the purchaser of the gas
"dependent" on both the product and the distribution system,68 and
in the other because the court viewed gas as a "product which could
be sold" within the meaning of section 2-106 of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code. 9 These decisions are difficult to reconcile with the
electricity cases which have denied liability for the product prior to
its entry into the customer's meter or line: one distinction may be
Buckeye Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Detroit Edison Co., 38 Mich. App. 325, 330 n.4 196 N.W.2d
316, 318 n.4 (1972).
66. The phrase "stream of commerce", which as noted (see text accompanying note 34
supra) was first used in Delaney v. Towmotor Corp., 339 F.2d 46 (2d Cir. 1964), was applied
by the Petroski court, citing the Indiana decision of Link v. Sun Oil Co., 312 N.E.2d 126,
130 (Ind. App. 1974) (dictum) as the proper test of manufacturer liability. None of the courts
set forth the contours of this test, however. See notes 115-116 and accompanying text infra.
67. See, e.g., Gardiner v. Philadelphia Gas Works, 413 Pa. 415, 197 A.2d 612 (1964)
(breach of warranty action by home owners who sustained personal injury when gas leaked
from defendant's main and entered home, causing explosion; supplying of gas on month-to-
month basis termed a "sale" or "contract of sale" under U.C.C. § 2-106); University of
Pittsburgh v. Equitable Gas Co., 126 P.L.J. 213 (Pa. C. P. Allegheny County 1978) (plaintiffs
educational building destroyed by explosion from leaking gas; furnishing gas via a pipeline
distribution system constitutes a continuance of sales/service transactions on which pur-
chaser is dependent and to which implied warranty and § 402A liability attach).
68. University of Pgh. v. Equitable Gas Co., 126 P.L.J. 213, 215 (Pa. C.P. Allegheny
County 1978).
69. Gardiner v. Philadelphia Gas Works, 412 Pa. 415, 420 n.8, 197 A.2d 612, 614 n.8 (1964)
(dictum). Although never mentioned in the court's opinion, it is implicit in Gardiner that
the defendant did not contest the warranty claim on the basis that the gas had not technically
left its possession. This was an action by the purchasers of natural gas who were injured
allegedly due to gas escaping from defendant's pipeline into their home. The defendant filed
preliminary objections raising a statute of limitations defense, and did not include a demurrer
on the basis that no "sale" had occurred. Id. at 417, 197 A.2d at 612. Subsequent Pennsyl-
vania decisions discussing Gardiner on the statute of limitations questions noted that the
plaintiffs in Gardiner were in direct privity of contract with the defendant under U.C.C. § 2-
318 and thus properly stated a breach of warranty claim. See, e.g., Salvador v. Atlantic Steel
Boiler Co., 389 A.2d 1148, 1152-53 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1978).
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that in the gas cases, the plaintiffs alleged a defect in the product
itself.70
In Shriver v. Consolidated Gas Supply Corp.,"' where the plain-
tiffs were innocent bystanders who were killed as a result of an
explosion of liquid propane vapor which had leaked from defen-
dant's interstate pipeline in a rural area, the court sustained the
defendant's demurrer to the strict liability counts. Conceptually,
this case is analogous to the electricity cases where third-party by-
standers were injured by contact with uninsulated wires. Even
though the plaintiff in Shriver alleged a defect in the product itself,7 2
a factor the absence of which arguably precluded the imposition of
strict liability in the electricity cases," the court applied the strin-
gent "control or dominion" test used in some of the electricity cases
and denied the strict liability claims. 4
It must be noted that although all of the cases in this section
involved hazardous products, it is not difficult to imagine hypothet-
ical situations where similar claims could arise involving other prod-
ucts. That the product was subject to a pre-existing contract of sale
(as in the hypothetical at the outset of this comment75 involving
bottled beverages) would seem to be one factor supporting a strict
liability claim.7" In and of itself, however, that factor arguably
70. The alleged defect in the gas itself was lack of odorants to facilitate detection by a
human being upon leakage of the gas from the pipeline. University of Pgh. v. Equitable Gas
Co., 126 P.L.J. 213, 215 (Pa. C.P. Allegheny County 1978); Shriver v. Consolidated Gas
Supply Corp., No. G.D. 78-14818 slip op. at 2 (Pa. C.P. Allegheny County February 8, 1979)
(Opinion and order sustaining defendant's demurrer to strict liability counts of complaint).
But see Gardiner v. Philadelphia Gas Works, 413 Pa. 415, 416, 197 A.2d 612, 612'(1964), where
the defect was the allegedly deteriorating and broken condition of the gas pipeline. The fact
that Gardiner was a pre-§ 402A case may account for the absence of an allegation of a defect
in the product itself.
71. Shriver v. Consolidated Gas Supply Corp., No. G.D. 78-14818 slip op. at 5, 7 (P. C.P.
Allegheny County February 8, 1979) (opinion and order sustaining demurrer to strict liability
counts of complaint).
72. See note 70 and accompanying text supra.
73. See Genaust v. Illinois Power Co., 62 I1. 2d 456, 464, 343 N.E.2d 465, 470 (1976). See
also notes 64-66 and accompanying text supra.
74. Shriver v. Consolidated Gas Supply Corp., No. G.D. 78-14818 slip. op. at 4 (Pa. C.P.
Allegheny County February 8, 1979).
75. See text preceding Part I supra.
76. Cf. Moreau v. Marler Ford Co., 282 So. 2d 852, 854 (La. App. 1973) (upon agreement
or contract to transfer a specific truck for a specifically-agreed upon price, there was a "sale"
even though the truck was not then delivered). The fact that there was a contract for sale of
the product would, if it,served as a benchmark for the "sale" requirement of § 402A or the
U.C.C. requirement of a "sale," inure to the benefit of any injured third parties, since the
requirement of privity in breach of warranty actions has been eroded. See, e.g., Salvador v.
Atlantic Steel Boiler Co., 457 P. 24, 28 n.9, 319 A.2d 903, 905 n.9 (1974). See also Pennsylvania
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should not be dispositive in the search for a functional, objective
stream of commerce test.
III. A PROPOSED STREAM OF COMMERCE TEST
As the above chronicle of existing pre-delivery strict liability cases
demonstrates,the question of when section 402A or warranties
should begin to attach, and what test should be applied to deter-
mine that question, is .not at all settled.
The preliminary and basic question is whether strict liability
should attach only after there has been a sale of the product or a
transfer of possession and whether, up to that point in time, the
manufacturer should be insulated from liability. It is suggested that
conditioning section 402A or breach of warranty liability on the
isolated event of transfer of possession, absent consideration of such
factors as whether the danger to the consuming public has arisen or
whether the manufacturer has effectively completed the manufac-
turing process, contravenes the policy underpinnings of strict liabil-
ity and, arbitrarily, exalts form over substance. At the same time,
a stream of commerce test which is sensitive to the manufacturer's
concern over having "strict" liability become "absolute" liability is
imperative.
The argument that strict liability should attach in certain instan-
ces prior to actual sale or delivery has a potent supporting founda-
tion in the consumer protection policy purposes of section 402A.17 It
also has support in related doctrinal developments which have ex-
tended strict liability protection to innocent bystanders" and have
laid to rest the theory that the only type of transaction which trig-
gers section 402A liability is a technical sale.79 The first two parts0
of this section discuss these justifications for the application of strict
liability backward along the distribution chain from the actual
transfer to the initial purchaser.
It is also proposed, in cases where injury occurs from a finished
product prior to sale or delivery, that several factors may be applied
Products Liability, supra note 11, at 392; Murray, Products Liability-Another Word, 35 U.
PiTT. L. REv. 255, 258-60 (1973).
77. See note 10 and accompanying text supra and notes 82-92 and accompanying text
infra.
78. See generally Strict Products Liability to the Bystander, note 1 supra. See also notes
93-108 and accompanying text infra.
79. See notes 109-114 and accompanying text infra.
80. See Parts A and B of the text of this section infra.
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in determining whether that product has effectively entered the
stream of commerce. These factors will be considered in the final
part"' of this section, which seeks to give some objective meaning to
the often-used and never clearly articulated phrase, "stream of com-
merce."
A. Policy Justifications
Innocent parties having no relation to a sales transaction between
a manufacturer of a product and its buyer are often vulnerable to
the hazards that defects in those products may create after manu-
facture. In the decision establishing strict tort liability for defective
products, Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc.,82 Justice Tray-
nor articulated the original purpose for the doctrine:
We need not recanvass the reasons for imposing strict liabil-
ity on the manufacturer. . . the purpose of such liability is to
insure that the costs of injuries resulting from defective prod-
ucts are borne by the manufacturer that puts such products on
the market rather than by the injured persons who are power-
less to protect themselves.83
This purpose of strict liability is bottomed upon two policy con-
siderations: first, the notion of loss spreading and, second, the
theory of deterrence. 4 The loss-spreading principle has been ac-
cepted by most courts as the primary justification for strict products
liability. 5 It shifts losses caused by defective products ultimately to
the manufacturer on the premise that he is best able to minimize
the effect of an economic loss by spreading it over large numbers of
persons, his purchasers .8
81. See Part C of the text of this section infra.
82. 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963). See also notes 3-10 and accompa-
nying text supra.
83. Id. at 63, 377 P.2d at 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 701.
84. See Strict Products Liability to the Bystander, supra note 1, at 635-43.
85. Id. at 635-36. See also Keeton, Products Liability-Some Observations About Alloca-
tion of Risks, 64 MICH. L. REV. 1329, 1333 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Products Liability].
Contra, Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel, (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50 MINN. L. REV.
791, 800 (1966). Despite Professor Prosser's contrary viewpoint, the loss-spreading principle
had been adopted in both Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods. Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 63, 377 P.2d
897, 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 701 (1963) and the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A,
comment c (1965).
86. The manufacturer either absorbs the loss or insures against it, in either case spreading
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The principle of deterrence as a policy justification for strict lia-
bility means simply that losses caused by defective products are
shifted to the manufacturer in order to deter him from marketing
such products." This has been subordinated to the loss-spreading
theory by the courts, 8 perhaps because many product defects which
are sufficient to impose liability do not result from reasonably
avoidable conduct by the manufacturer. 9
If the purpose of strict liability is to protect "injured persons
powerless to protect themselves,"90 a theory the drafters of section
402A adopted,9 then attaching some transcendant significance to
the transfer or delivery of the product contravences that purpose.
Applying a technical "possession" test has the effect of arbitrarily
denying strict liability to an injured party simply because he or she
was in the wrong place at the wrong time,"2 while sustaining the
cause of action for a person injured by the same defect on the other
side of the "magic" time of exchange or transfer of possession. Once
a product has been placed in such a manner that potential harm to
the additional cost among all subsequent purchasers of his product in the form of higher
prices. See G. CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS-A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYIS 50-51
(1970).
87. This principle was concisely stated by Justice Traynor in Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling
Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 461, 462, 150 P.2d 436, 440, 440-41 (1944) (Traynor, J., concurring).
88. See Products Liability, supra note 85, at 1333.
89. See Strict Products Liability to the Bystander, supra note 1 at 639.
90. Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d at 63, 377 P.2d at 901, 27 Cal. Rptr.
at 701 (emphasis added).
91. Comment c to § 402A expressly recognizes this purpose of imposing strict liability on
the manufacturers of defective products. This comment reads:
c. On whatever theory, the justification for the strict liability has been said to be
that the seller, by marketing his product for use and consumption, has undertaken and
assumed a special responsibility toward any member of the consuming public who may
be injured by it; that the public has the right to and does expect, in the case of products
which it needs and for which it is forced to rely upon the seller, that reputable sellers
will stand behind their goods; that public policy demands that the burden of acciden-
tal injuries caused by products intended for consumption be placed upon those who
market them, and be treated as a cost of production against which liability insurance
can be obtained ....
92. This is graphically illustrated by the natural gas hypothetical preceding the Introduc-
tion of this comment supra. There, under the possession test, an innocent bystander injured
by the leak of defective gas from the defendant's pipeline prior to the initial delivery would
be denied recovery, while an innocent bystander who happened to encounter the leaking gas
at a point along the initial purchaser's pipeline would have a claim against the manufacturer
because at that point, the gas would have been "sold." This also creates the somewhat
anomalous result of the manufacturer being strictly liable for his failure to odorize gas when
it escapes from the reseller's pipeline but not from the manufacturer's pipeline. See notes 71-
75 and accompanying text supra.
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the consuming public from a defect in the product has arisen,
human beings are vulnerable to injury. The point in time of sale or
delivery, as a triggering mechanism for strict liability, is far too
inflexible a test in light of the broad remedial purposes of the strict
liability doctrine.
B. Justifications Based on Related Doctrinal Developments
Two developments in the expanding law of strict products liabil-
ity also lend support to the theory that the manufacturer can be
liable prior to the actual sale or delivery of the product.
The first of these developments in the increasing protection for
third persons, or "innocent bystanders" who are neither purchasers
nor users of the product. 3 This is significant because many, if not
most, of the situations in which injuries occur prior to actual sale
or delivery will be to innocent bystanders. In both strict tort liabil-
ity"4 and breach of warranty actions"5 the courts have recognized
that bystanders, with no relationship at all to the product transac-
tion, are often just as susceptible to injury as the actual purchaser
or consumer.
The framers of section 402A specified a list of persons expressly
protected by the rule, and included guests or donees of the pur-
chaser, those passively enjoying the benefit of a product (such as an
automobile passenger), and those performing work on the product."
-As to whether casual bystanders would be protected, the American
Law Institute, the drafters of the section, expressed no unequivocal
opinion," simply noting that these parties "have been denied recov-
93. See generally HuRsH &BAILEY, supra note 4, § 10:43 at 421-93; Strict Products Liabil-
ity to the Bystander, supra note 1; Noel, Defective Products: Extension of Strict Liability to
Bystanders, 38 TENN. L. REv. 1 (1970); Comment, Cave Adstantem: Bystander Recovery in
Products Liability Cases, 2 CREIGHTON L. REv. 295 (1969).
94. See generally [1974] 1 PROD. LIAR. REP. (CCH) 4020; HURsH & BAILEY, supra note
4, § 4:25 at 710-15.
95. See generally [19741 1 PROD. LIAR. REP. (CCH) 4110, 4210,
96. Comment I to § 402A provides in relevant part as follows:
I. User or consumer. In order for the rule stated in this Section to apply, it is not
necessary that the ultimate user or consumer have acquired the product directly from
the seller, although the rule applies equally if he does so. He may have acquired it
through one or more intermediate dealers. It is not even necessary that the consumer
have purchased the product at all. He may be a member of the family of the final
purchaser, or his employee, or a guest at his table, or a mere donee from the purchaser.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment 1 (1965).
97. Comment o to § 402A, after noting that the courts applying strict liability had denied
recovery to casual bystanders and others who may come in contact with the product, states:
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ery."I' Since the formulation of the Restatement, however, a grow-
ing number of jurisdictions have allowed such parties to recover.9
The major barrier to recovery by innocent bystanders on a breach
of warranty theory was the privity requirement.'0 As Pennsylvania's
example'"' illustrates, some states which adopted Section 402A
found themselves in an anomaly because the privity require-
ment still existed for warranty actions while not existing for section
402A actions.'0 Pennsylvania solved the problem by judicially abol-
ishing '"'3 horizontal privity altogether, as comment 3 to U.C.C. sec-
tion 2-318 allowed,' 4 thus extending the protection already afforded
Itihere may be no essential reason why such plaintiffs should not be brought within
the scope of the protection afforded, other than that they do not have the same reasons
for expecting such protecton as the consumer .... The Institute expresses neither
approval nor disapproval of expansion of the rule to permit recovery by such persons.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment o (1965). For an argument contrary to the
ALI's speculation that the bystanders do not have the same expectations of protection as
consumers, see Strict Products Liability to the Bystander, supra note 1, at 638-39, 641-42.
98. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment o (1965).
99. See e.g., Caruth v. Mariani, 11 Ariz. App. 188,463 P.2d 83 (1970); Elmore v. American
Motors Corp.. 70 Cal. 2d 578, 451 P.2d 84, 75 Cal. Rptr. 652 (1969); Bradford v. Bendex-
Westinghouse Automotive Air Brake Co., 517 P.2d 406 (Colo. App. 1973); Mitchell v. Miller,
26 Conn. Supp. 142, 214 A.2d 694 (1965); Toombs v. Fort Pierce Gas Co., 208 So. 2d 615 (Fla.
1968); Mieher v. Brown, 54 111. 2d 539, 301 N.E.2d 307 (1973); Chrysler Corp. v. Alumbaugh,
342 N.E.2d 908 (Ind. App. 1976); Embs v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co.. 528 S.W.2d 703 (Ky. App.
1975); Landry v. Adam, 282 So. 2d 590 (La. App. 1973); Piercefield v. Remington Arms. Co.,
375 Mich. 85. 113 N.W.2d 129 (1965); Giberson v. Ford Motor Co., 504 S.W.2d 8 (Mo. 1974);
Lamendola v. Mizell, 115 N.J. Super 514, 280 A.2d 241 (1971); Codling v. Paglia, 32 N.Y.2d
330, 345 N.Y.S.2d 461, 298 N.E,2d 622 (1973); Moss v. Polyco, Inc., 522 P.2d 622 (Okla. 1974);
Darryl v. Ford Motor Co., 440 S.W.2d 630 (Tex. 1969); Howes v. Hansen, 56 Wis. 2d 247,
201 N.W.2d 825 (1972). See also Passwaters v. General Motors Corp., 454 F.2d 1270 (8th Cir.
1972) (applying Iowa law). In Pennsylvania, the cases which have abolished the requirement
of privity in warranty actions implicitly support the notion that a bystander can recover under
§ 402A. See Kassab v. Central Soya, 432 Pa. 217, 246 A.2d 848 (1968) (abolishing vertical
privity); Salvador v. Atlantic Steel Boiler Co., 457 Pa. 24, 25 n.1, 31-33, 319 A.2d 903, 904
n.1, 907-08 (1974) (abolishing horizontal privity). In the original decision in Pennsylvania
adopting § 402A. Webb v. Zern, 422 Pa. 424, 220 A.2d 853 (1966), the injured party was the
son of the purchaser of a keg of beer which exploded. Arguably, this is a bystander case,
although it is not clear from the opinion whether the plaintiff was a "consumer" of the beer
so that he would be protected under comment I to § 402A, or whether he was an innocent
bystander as contemplated by comment o to § 402A. 422 Pa. at 425, 220 A.2d at 854.
100. See, e.g.. Pennsylvania Products Liability, supra note 11, at 392, 408-16.
101. See Kassab v. Central Soya, 432 Pa. 217, 246 A.2d 848 (1968) and Salvador v.
Atlantic Steel Boiler Co., 457 Pa. 24, 319 A.2d 903 (1974). See also note 99 and accompanying
text supra.
102. See Penns vlvania Products Liability, supra note 11, at 408-16.
103. Salvador v. Atlantic Steel Boiler Co., 457 Pa. 24, 319 A.2d 903 (1974).
104. U.C.C. § 2-318, comment 3, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, § 2-318, comment 3 (Purdon
1970). This comment reads in part:
Duquesne Law Review Vol. 17: 3-4
by its version of U.C.C. section 2-318.O5 Other states have given the
bystander protection by adopting an alternative version of U.C.C.
section 2-318106 which protects "any natural person which may rea-
sonably be expected to use, consume or be affected by the goods."'' 7
Since it is now commonly accepted that innocent bystanders de-
serve strict liability protection as much, if not more, 08 than pur-
The first alternative expressly includes as beneficiaries within its provisions the
family, household, and guests of the purchaser. Beyond this, the section in this form
is neutral and is not intended to enlarge or restrict the developing case law on whether
the seller's warranties, given to his buyer who resells, extend to other persons in the
distributive chain.
Id.
105. Pennsylvania adopted the original version of U.C.C. § 2-318, which currently reads
as follows:
§ 2-318. Third Party Beneficiaries of Warranties Express or Implied
A seller's warranty whether express or implied extends to any natural person who is
in the household of his buyer or who is a guest in his home if it is reasonable to expect
that such person may use, consume or be affected by the goods and who is injured in
person by breach of the warranty. A seller may not exclude or limit the operation of
this section.
Id. (emphasis added).
As of this writing, 30 states have adopted this version of § 2-318, which only extends
warranty protection to a certain class of individuals. See [19741 1 PROD. LIAB. REP. (CCH) 1
4110. Pennsylvania is one of many of those thirty states which also has judicially expanded
the coverage of § 2-318 to include innocent bystanders reasonably forseeable. See generally
J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 11-
3 at 329-32 (1972) [hereinafter cited as WHITE & SUMMERSi. See also note 104 and accompa-
nying text supra.
106. The Permanent Editorial Board for the Uniform Commercial Code, as part of its 1966
Official Recommendations for Amendment, offered two optional versions of U.C.C. § 2-318.
WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 105, at 331. Alternative B reads as follows:
A seller's warranty whether express or implied extends to any natural person who may
reasonably be expected to use, consume or be affected by the goods and who is injured
by breach of the warranty. A seller may not exclude or limit the operation of this
section.
U.C.C. § 2-318, Alternative B (emphasis added). Alternative C reads exactly the same as
Alternative B except for the deletion of the word "natural" and the addition of the phrase
"with respect to injury to the person of an individual to whom the warranty extends" at the
end. U.C.C. § 2-318, Alternative C. Six states have adopted Alternative B or a similar
provision (Alabama, Kansas, Vermont, New York, South Carolina and Delaware) and seven
have adopted Alternative C or a similar provision (Arkansas, Hawaii, North Dakota, Colo-
rado, Minnesota, Rhode Island and Wyoming). In lieu of, or in addition to an election of one
of these sections, several states (Arkansas, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode
Island and Virginia) have abolished privity in their § 2-318. Louisiana has not adopted the
U.C.C.: California and Utah omit § 2-318 from their commercial codes, and Texas § 2-318
specifically leaves the matter of who may sue or be sued in warranty to the courts. [1974]
PROD. LIAB. REP. (CCH) $ 4110.
107. U.C.C. § 2-318, Alternatives B & C.
108. See Strict Products Liability to the Bystander, supra note 1, at 638-39,.641-42. See
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chasers, it is arbitrary to deny an innocent bystander who encoun-
ters a defective product prior to its transfer the opportunity to prove
his section 402A or warranty claim.
The second doctrinal development which supports the predelivery
liability concept is the rejection of the notion that the only transac-
tion which will trigger section 402A liability is a technical "sale."
The courts have come to recognize that there are many transactions
"sales" which can provide a basis for strict liability. In particular,
most recent decisions have applied section 402A to bailment and
lease transactions.0 In the course of this new development, some
courts have hearkened back to the holding in Delaney v. Towmotor
Corp., 1,0 that the "sale" language in section 402A is a description of
the type of situation which has most commonly arisen"' rather than
a limitation of the doctrine to cases where the product actually has
been sold."' Some courts have also found themselves resorting to
tests analogous to the Delaney "stream of commerce" theory in the
course of developing this new application of strict liability. For ex-
ample, in Francioni v. Gibsonia Trucking Co., "3 the Pennsylvania
decision applying section 402A and warranties to lease transactions,
the court noted that the critical factor in strict liability is not the
method of marketing, but rather the fact that marketing has oc-
curred, whether by sale, lease or bailment, for use and consumption
by the public, and "where the fundamental principles are applica-
ble, the imposition of artificial distinctions will only frustrate the
also W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 100, at 663 (4th ed. 1971) (arguing that
the effect of extending the protection of the doctrine to casual bystanders was to put strict
liability on the same footing as negligence with respect to the question of forseeability).
109. See, e.g., Bachner v. Pearson, 479 P.2d 319 (Alaska 1970); Price v. Shell Oil Co., 2
Cal. 3d 245, 466 P.2d 722, 85 Cal. Rptr. 178 (1970); Whitfield v. Cooper, 30 Conn. Supp. 47,
298 A.2d 80 (1972); Martin v. Ryder Truck Rental, Inc., 353 A.2d 581 (Del. 1976); Stewart v.
Budget Rent-a-Car Corp., 52 Haw. 71, 470 P.2d (1970); Bainter v. Lemoine LP Gas Co., 24
Ill. App. 3d 913, 321 N.E.2d 744 (1974); Galluccio v. Hertz Corp., 1 111. App. 3d 272, 274
N.E.2d 178 (1971); Gilbert v. Stone City Constr. Co., 357 N.E.2d 739 (Ind. App. 1976);
Cintrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing & Rental Service, 45 N.J. 434, 212 A.2d 769 (1965); Strong
v. Hertz Corp., 83.N.M. 730, 497 P.2d 732 (1972); Coleman v. Hertz Corp., 534 P.2d 940 (Okla.
App. 1975): Francioni v. Gibsonia Trucking Co., 472 Pa. 362, 372 A.2d 736 (1977); Rourke v.
Garza, 530 S.W.2d 794 (Tex. 1975). But see, e.g., Browning-Ferris Industries Inc. v. Baden
Tire Center, Inc., 536 S.W.2d 203 (Mo. App. 1976) (doctrine held not applicable to mutual-
benefit bailments). See also notes 27-28 & 43-48 and accompanying text supra.
110. 339 F.2d 4 (2d Cir. 1964). See notes 28, 42 & 48 and accompanying text supra.
111. See notes 4 & 9 and accompanying text supra.
112. Delaney v. Towmotor Corp., 339 F.2d 4, 6 (2d Cir. 1964).
113. 472 Pa. 362, 372 A.2d 736 (1977).
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intended purpose. '1 4
In extending strict liability to non-sale cases, the courts have
looked beyond the mere form of the transaction and focused on its
substance, that is, whether the manufacturer has so situated his
product on the market that a danger to the consuming public from
a defect in the product exists. By analogy, an emphasis on the time
of delivery or moment the product changes hands as the triggering
time for strict liability ignores the fact that, in many cases, the
harm to the consuming public has arisen long before that point in
time. The rejection by the courts of technical arguments over the
form of the transactions in applying Section 402A provides support
for the proposition that they should similarly ignore technical argu-
ments concerning the time at which the transaction takes place.
C. The Test Delineated: Clarifying Existing "Stream of
Commerce" Language
Assuming a court decides, when faced with a case involving an
injury while the product is in transit, that the technical time of
transfer of possession will not be dispositive and will not insulate the
defendant from strict liability, a determinaton must then be made
as to what factors should be applied to determine whether the plain-
tiff has stated a cause of action in strict liability. Many courts have
used the phrase "stream of commerce" or analogous language in
products liability cases, " but no cognizable guidelines emerge from
the case law as to what constitutes "stream of commerce." This is
because most of the cases where the phrase was used involved the
question of whether strict liability should be applied to a transac-
tion regardless of its form:'" in other words, the product had ex-
114. Id. at 367, 372 A.2d at 738 (citing Link v. Sun Oil Co., 312 N.E.2d 126, 130 (Ind.
App. 1974) ("[tlhe word 'sells' as contained in the text of § 402A is merely descriptive, and
the product need not be actually sold if it has been injected into the stream of commerce by
other means").
115. See, e.g., Delaney v. Towmotor Corp., 339 F.2d 4,6 (2d Cir. 1964); Kriegler v. Eichler
Homes, Inc., 269 Cal. App. 2d 224, 227, 74 Cal. Rptr. 749, 752 (1969), Herbstrom v. Eastman
Kodak Co., 68 N.J. 1, 342 A.2d 181 (1975). Many of the cases in which § 402A was applied to
bailments, leases or rentals used "stream of commerce" language. See cases cited in note 110
supra. The explanation for the fact that none of these courts set forth factors to consider in
determining what constitutes "stream of commerce" may be that such a delineation was
unnecessary to the decision, since the issue in the bailment/lease cases was the applicability
of § 402A to a different form of transaction, not a time § 402A begins to attach.
116. See note 115 supra.
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changed hands or possession and the injury occurred thereafter.
Delineation of the meaning of "stream of commerce" thus was un-
necessary to the decisions in those cases.
In formulating a test, one salient factor must be kept in mind.
Imposing too liberal a test will all but transform strict liability into
absolute liability, make the manufacturer an insurer"7 of his prod-
uct's safety, and thus not encourage him to apply as many precau-
tionary tests or checks on the product as he otherwise would.
The following is offered as a proposed stream of commerce test,
for situations where the injury occurs either while the product is
within the manufacturer's control or on its plant, or while the prod-
uct is in transit. Under the proposal, a product is in the stream of
commerce when it has been placed or situated in such a manner that
danger to the consuming public in general or certain persons in
particular exists. One or all of the following factors may be consid-
ered in determining the question of whether a product meets this
test: (1) whether the manufacturer has completed the process of
manufacture, including testing of the product in question (except
testing in areas in which the danger to the consuming public in
general or to specific non-employeesI s in particular exists would not
insulate the manufacturer from liability); (2) whether the product
is being used at the time of the injury; (3) the physical location of
the product at the time of the injury (in other words, in transit, on
the manufacturer's plant, etc.); (4) whether a danger to the consum-
ing public in general or to certain reasonably forseeable persons" 9
117. Pennsylvania appellate courts have recently used the phrase "the manufacturer is
effectively the guarantor of his product's safety." See Berkebile v. Brantley Helicopter Corp.,
462 Pa. 83, 93, 337 A.2d 893, 898 (1975); Salvador v. Atlantic Steel Boiler Co., 457 Pa. 24,
32, 319 A.2d 903, 907 (1974). However, they have simultaneously stated that they do not mean
the term "guarantor" to mean "insurer". See Azzarello v. Black Bros. Co., 391 A.2d 1020,
1024 (Pa. 1978) (strict liability not intended to make defendant insurer) (citing Wade, Strict
Tort Liability of Manufacturers, 19 S.W.L.T.J. 13 (1965)).
118. The term "non-employees" is used here because cases in which employees are injured
by products manufactured by defendant and being used on its premises present workman's
compensation issues which are beyond the scope of this comment. To the extent those cases
would hold that the injured employee could hurdle the bar of workmen's compensation
statutes and sue in tort, however, then the test proposed in this comment would be applica-
ble. For example of cases in which the workman's compensation issue has arisen in this
context, see Winkler v. Hyster Co., 54 Ill. App. 3d 282, 369 N.E.2d 606 (1977) and Douglas v.
E. & J. Gallo Winery, 69 Cal. App. 3d 103, 137 Cal. Rptr. 797 (1977).
119. The term "reasonably forseeable persons" in this context is not meant to relate in
any way to an assessment of the defendant-manufacturer's conduct similar to that which
would be undertaken in a negligence action. The term only is used here as a limitation, in a
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in particular has arisen from the product's physical location at the
time of the injury; (5) whether a contract for the sale of the product
has been executed; and (6) the hazardous nature of the product.
Although this methodology suggests a case-by-case analysis, with
the determination of "stream of commerce" being a question of law
for the court, certain propositions seem clear. First, strict liability
is inappropriate in a case where the product is merely in storage on
the manufacturer's premises. However, a contrary result is justified
where the product is being used by the manufacturer for the purpose
for which it was intended in such a way that the possibility of injury
to a person exists from that use' 20 or where it is being displayed for
potential customer perusal. 21 In these two limited situations, the
courts could justify the application of strict liability on the basis
that the manufacturer has "constructively" placed his product in
the stream of commerce. 112 Strict liability is also inappropriate
proximate cause sense, on the class of persons to whom the protection of strict liability should
extend once the court decides that strict liability is appropriate prior to sale or delivery. It is
analogous to the "forseeable plaintiff" concept in negligence, which provides that the conduct
of the defendant will not be the proximate cause of injury to remotely or unusually-situated
parties. See, e.g., Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928) (plaintiff
injured by fall of scales on railway platform caused by explosion of firecrackers dislodged from
boarder of train by defendant's employees held not entitled to recover from railroad). It is
also analogous to the doctrine in products liability whereby misuse will not be a defense if
the plaintiff's use of the product was reasonably forseeable by the manufacturer. See, e.g.,
Barker v. Lull Eng'ring Co., 20 Cal. 2d 413, 429-30, 573 P.2d 443, 454, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225,
236 (1978) (product may be defective if plaintiff demonstrates that it failed to perform as
safely as an ordinary consumer would expect when used in reasonably forseeable manner).
120. Compare Winkler v. Hyster Co., 54 I1. App. 3d 282, 369 N.E.2d 606 (1977) with
Douglas v. E. & J. Gallo Winery, 69 Cal. App. 3d 103, 137 Cal. Rptr. 797 (1977). Despite the
fact that, when the manufacturer has decided to use one of its finished product on its prem-
ises, the product has never been the subject of a market transaction at all, liability would be
justified here on two alternative bases. First, the court could decide that the manufacturer
had "constructively" placed the product in the stream of commerce. Secondly, the court
could describe the manufacturer's manipulation of the product as a type of bailment within
its own operation, justifying strict liability by analogy to the cases disregarding the form of
the exchange of a manufactured product. See Winkler v. Hyster Co., 54 Ill. App. 3d 282, 288,
369 N.E.2d 606, 612 (1977) (Craven, P.J., dissenting); Douglas v. E. & J. Gallo Winery, 69
Cal. App. 3d 103, 137 Cal. Rptr. 797 (1977). See also notes 109-114 and accompanying text
supra. This liability would be inappropriate, however, where-although the product is being
used for the purpose intended-that use is indispensable to a test of other products. See note
131 infra.
121. Cf. Kroger Co. v. Bowman, 411 S.W.2d 339 (Ky. 1967) (retailer who had placed
defective products on display liable for injury to customer while handling). See also notes 51-
60 and accompanying text supra.
122. The term "constructive stream of commerce" in these situations is used because, as
noted in note 120 supra, the manufacturer technically has never made the product the subject
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where the product is still being tested or otherwise remains in the
manufacturer's process, provided that the tests are taking place on
the manufacturer's premises, in an area where potential harm to the
public does not exist, and provided further that the manufacturing
is not split between two separate plants requiring the transportation
of a partially-finished product which is capable of causing damage
in public areas between the two places.'13
These two limitations hopefully would accommodate the manu-
facturer's justifiable concern over becoming an insurer of his pro-
ducts or having strict liability literally thrust into the manufactur-
ing plant itself. In all other respects, however, the test contem-
plates that liability may arise during the process which constitutes
the most integral part of the relationship with the buyer: delivery
of the finished product. It must be remembered that the manu-
facturer may still prevail in the case if he proves the product was
not defective: the test only allows the plaintiff to avoid a demurrer.
At the same time, of course, the traditional defenses to strict
liability actions'21 such as assumption of the risk and product
misuse will also serve as liability-limiting factors.
IV. CONCLUSION
Under a "stream of commerce" test that determines which point
in time strict liability should begin to attach by focusing on when
the harm to the consuming public in general has arisen, the answers
* to the three hypothetical situations posed at the beginning of this
comment' 25 seem clear. In all three, injured plaintiffs should be able
to carry a strict liability case to the jury. In the first hypothetical,
where the auto manufacturer directs an employee to take a car on
of a market transaction here. Had the manufacturer placed that same product on the market
and it caused injury, however, the manufacturer would be strictly liable. He should arguably
not be able to avoid liability simply because he decided to use such a dangerous product on
his own premises. But see Winkler v. Hyster Co., 54 Ill. App. 3d 282. 369 N.E.2d 606 (1977).
123. But see Shriver v. Consolidated Gas Supply Corp., No. G.D. 78-14818 (Pa. C.P.
Allegheny County February 8, 1979) (order sustaining demurrer to strict liability counts of
plaintiff's complaint in liquid propane gas case where defendant alleged manufacturing pro-
cess not complete along the pipeline route). The reasons strict liability should not apply while
the product is still in the manufacturing process are that, first, the manufacturer must be
encouraged to make as many safety checks on the product as possible and second, § 402A in
its own terms works against "products." See note 13 and accompanying text supra.
124. For a discussion of the defenses to strict liability actions, see HURsH & BAILEY, supra
note 4, §§ 4:33-:42.
125. See text preceding Introduction supra.
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a test ride in a rural area, the'possibility of injury to another motor-
ist exists if the car is defective. While this injury, concededly, occurs
during a test of the product, the manufacturer should not be enti-
tled to insulate itself from potential strict liability since it has cho-
sen to conduct its test in an area in which harm to the public in
general is likely if there are defects in the product. In the bottled
beverage hypothetical, the manufacturer would potentially be liable
under section 402A or breach of warranty theories since the product
was subject to a contract of sale, the delivery of the product was part
of the bottler's performance of his executory duties under the con-
tract, and, in any case, the product has been so placed on the mar-
ket that potential harm to the public clearly exists if the bottle is
defective. Finally, in the natural gas hypothetical, strict liability
would be appropriate since the manufacturing process is com-
pleted' 21 and the product has been placed into the channels of distri-
bution. While this volatile product'2 is in transit toward its ultimate
transfer of possession, a definite risk of harm to the public has
arisen. The manufacturer should not be allowed to escape this lia-
bility by technical arguments that delivery has not taken place. 2 1
In the cases where the product is in the manufacturer's control or
on its premises, strict liability should not be applicable unless the
product is being used for the purpose intended and the potential for
bodily injury exists to a third party29 or unless the product is being
126. A manufacturer should not be allowed to escape this liability by arguing that, along
the pipeline route, the gas is in a semi-manufactured state because odorants will not added
until the second plant. Otherwise, he would be permitted to place a dangerously defective
article into the stream of commerce and escape the consequences of the damage that product
may inflict. See notes 71-74 & 120 and accompanying text supra.
127. If a product is highly volatile, the manufacturer may also be potentially liable on
the theory of absolute liability for an ultrahazardous activity. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF TORTS §§ 519, 520 (1977) (sections imposing absolute liability for the conduct of
injury-causing extrahazardous activity).
128. But see Shriver v. Consolidated Gas Supply Corp., No. G.D. 78-14818 (Pa. C.P.
Allegheny County February 8, 1979), in which the court adopted this argument. See also notes
71-74 and accompanying text supra. In Davis v. Gibson Prods.. Inc., 505 S.W.2d 682, 691
(Tex. Civ. App. 1973), the court explained stream of commerce as follows:
The stream of commerce includes the manufacture of the object and its distribution,
including the activities of retailers. Unless it be argued that goods displayed for sale
by a retailer are not in the stream of commerce, it is clear that continuation of the
flow of commerce does not require transfers of possession.
Id. at 691.
129. It must be clear that the plaintiff is a person the defendant could reasonably forsee
to be vulnerable if the product was defective and also, if the plaintiff is a bystander, that he
is not aware of the defect and has not assumed the risk of confronting it. See also note 121
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demonstrated to potential purchasers. Under this test, then, the
decision in Armstrong Rubber Co. v. Urquidez'3° was proper since
the product was being used in the testing process only,'3 ' while the
result in Winkler v. Hyster Co.'31 was improper, since the product
was actively being used for the purpose intended and was construc-
tively in the stream of commerce. This result, it must be noted, was
implied in the California decision in Douglas v. E. & J. Gallo
Winery, ' 'n where the manufacturer was using its own product for the
purpose intended on its premises. Absent such use or display, the
insulation of the manufacturer from strict liability in cases where
the product is in its control or in storage on its premises would
reflect the countervailing concern for encouraging manufacturers to
take all possible corrective measures before releasing the product
into the channels of commerce.
The purpose of the doctrine of strict liability generally is to pro-
tect not only innocent product purchasers but all members of the
public who are exposed to the hazards created by defective prod-
ucts. A test for the point in time strict liability should begin to
attach-which focuses, among other things, on when danger to the
public at large has arisen-is more consistent with the remedial
goals of strict liability than an approach which attaches conclusive
significance to that point at which the initial sale or delivery of the
product takes place.
ROBERT J. MARINO
and accompanying text supra.
130. 570 S.W.2d 374 (Tex. 1978). See also notes 14-28 and accompanying text supra.
131. Even though the actual tire which caused the injury in Armstrong Rubber Co. was
not itself the subject of the test, the manufacturer should still be insulated from liability,
since, in tire-testing on road conditions, it is impossible to test one tire without using other
tires in the process. Any argument by the injured plaintiff that the non-tested tires are being
used for the purpose intended, a factor which would trigger strict liability under the test
proposed in this comment, should therefore be rejected in situations where the defective
product is an indispensable part of the testing of other products.
132. 54 ]11. App. 3d 282, 369 N.E.2d 606 (1977). See also notes 28-37 supra.
133. 69 Cal. App. 3d 103, 137 Cal. Rptr. 797 (1977). Although Douglas did not explicitly
address the products liability question, it implied that plaintiff could state a § 402A claim,
since it sent the case back to the trial court and overruled the demurrers. The court stated:
"[mlanufacturer's liability clearly arises where plaintiff employee is injured in using a
product designed and manufactured primarily for sale for the general public and only inciden-
tally used in the defendant's other activities." Id. at 113, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 803.
1978-79

